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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN QUAS,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 890601-CA
Priority No. 2

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
In the February 6, 1992 Quas opinion, this Court relied on
State v. Humphrey, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 1991), in holding that
Mr. Quas' conviction mooted, cured and/or rendered harmless any
defects in the bindover order.

Quas at 2, 3, and 5.

This Court has not had the benefit of briefing by the
parties on the Humphrey decision.

Because this Court has not had

the opportunity to fully consider the constitutional ramifications
of the Humphrey decision in the context of this case, Mr. Quas
respectfully requests rehearing.1

See Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512

(Utah 1886)(explaining circumstances allowing rehearing); Cumminas
v. Nielson. 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913)(same).

1. In the original proceedings for rehearing of the June
18, 1991 Quas decision, counsel for Mr. Quas and counsel for the
State agreed that the opinion's plain error analysis relating to
expert testimony was confusing and should be modified, although the
parties disagreed as to how the analysis should be modified.
Petition at 7-8; response at 5-6. The February 6, 1992 Quas
decision contains the same plain error analysis. Counsel for Mr.
Quas maintain but do not repeat the argument raised in the original
petition for rehearing concerning the plain error analysis, and
refer to that argument here in order to preserve it.

A copy of this Court's February 6, 1992 opinion is in
Appendix 1.

A copy of the Humphrey decision is in Appendix 2.

ARGUMENT
I.
BECAUSE THE DEFECTIVE BINDOVER ORDER
CONSTITUTES A DEFECT IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT,
IT CANNOT BE CURED, MOOTED OR RENDERED HARMLESS
BY THE CONVICTION.
The Ouas opinion's holding that any error in the bindover
order was mooted, cured or rendered harmless by Mr. Quas' conviction
is based on footnote 6 of State v. Humphrey. 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 8
(Utah 1991), which states,
We note that if the orders of magistrates
were in fact orders of a circuit court, the Utah
State Constitution would provide an appeal as of
right from these orders. Utah Const, art. I,
§12, art. VIII §5. Interlocutory appeal to the
court of appeals would not satisfy this
requirement. We believe this right likewise
would not be satisfied if the defendant first had
to endure trial in the district court, because
any challenges to the bindover order would be
mooted by the trial verdict.2 Our construction
avoids this constitutional problem.
Id. at 10-11.
This portion of the Humphrey opinion is dicta.

2. This portion of the Humphrey opinion may be attributed
to the briefs of the appellant/petitioners in Humphrey. which raised
the mootness argument and failed to appreciate the jurisdictional
nature of proper preliminary hearings. See briefs of appellants in
case numbers 890424-CA, 890130-CA, 890666-CA; and of petitioners in
case number 900434. Appellate counsel regrets the confusion arising
from her argument.
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The holding of Humphrey is key to understanding why the
illegal bindover order was not mooted or rendered harmless by Mr.
Quas# conviction.

Repeatedly throughout the Humphrey opinion, the

court held that a proper bindover order is essential to the
jurisdiction of the district court over the criminal case, and that
the district court has the obligation to review the bindover
proceedings, to insure that the district court's original
jurisdiction is invoked properly.

Humphrey at 9 and 10 and nn. 2

and 5.3
Because a defective bindover order fails to properly invoke
the jurisdiction of the district court, it cannot be considered
harmless error under the state or federal constitutions.

State v.

Pay, 146 P.2d 300 (Utah 1950), was decided under the Utah
Constitution.

There, the court characterized deficiencies in the

3. Utah's conditioning of district court jurisdiction on a
proper bindover order differs from decisions from other courts. See
footnote 4 of State's supplemental brief at page 13 (arguing that
this Court should follow case law from California holding that
insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing does not constitute
a jurisdictional defect in the trial court). Humphrey and State v.
Freeman. 71 P.2d 196 (Utah 1937), cited in footnote 2 of Humphrey
for the proposition that district court jurisdiction is contingent
upon the propriety of the bindover order, are decided under Utah
statutes and the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the Utah Supreme
Court's holdings conditioning district court jurisdiction on the
propriety of the bindover order are binding on all state and federal
courts. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 561
(1983)(jurisdictional provisions based in state constitutions are
matters of state law, and the rulings of the state court control);
State v. Pay, 146 P. 300 (Utah 1915)(in discussing how a district
court's jurisdiction is contingent on the propriety of the bindover
proceedings, the Utah court discussed law from other jurisdictions,
but found the Utah Constitution controlling).
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preliminary hearing as flaws in the trial court's jurisdiction.
at 302 and 305.

Id.

Because of errors occurring in the preliminary

hearing proceedings, the court reversed Mr. Pay's conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt, and ordered the trial court to quash the
information so that Mr. Pay's rights to proper preliminary
proceedings would be protected.

Id. at 306.

The court did not

apply harmless error analysis to the jurisdictional defect arising
from deficiencies in the preliminary hearing.
In Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), the Court
held that federal magistrates do not have jurisdiction to conduct
voir dire in felony trials without the defendant's consent.

The

Court further held that jurisdictional defects can never be harmless
error, stating,
Among those basic fair trial rights that "'can
never be treated as harmless'11 is a defendant's
"right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge
or jury." Equally basic is a defendant's right
to have all critical stages of a criminal trial
conducted by a person with jurisdiction to
preside. Thus harmless-error analysis does not
apply in a felony case in which, despite the
defendant's objection and without any meaningful
review by a district judger an officer exceeds
his jurisdiction by selecting a jury.
Id. at 876 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

Gomez is a

unanimous decision.
The Quas opinion relies on several cases to support the
holding that the conviction mooted, or cured, defects in the
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preliminary hearing in this case.4

The federal cases relied on do

not support the holding, but are inapposite to this case because
those cases do not involve jurisdictional flaws resulting from
inadequacies in preliminary hearings, and because those cases were
not decided under Utah law establishing the jurisdictional
significance of preliminary hearings in this state.
Rather than supporting the holding that errors in
preliminary hearings are cured or mooted by convictions beyond a
reasonable doubt, Schreuder demonstrates the opposite.

Quas

correctly notes that Schreuder holds that an illegal arrest does not
justify a reversal of a valid conviction.

However, Schreuder

reaches that conclusion only after determining that an illegal
arrest is not a jurisdictional defect.

712 P.2d 264, at 272.

4. The opinion states,
This holding is supported by case law from
the United States Supreme Court and from this
state establishing that an error at the
preliminary stage is cured if the defendant is
later convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106
5. Ct. 938, 942 (1986) (presence of two witnesses
in grand jury room, although illegal, is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt in light of subsequent
conviction); Holt v. United States. 218 U.S. 245,
31 S. Ct. 2, 4 (1910)(conviction upheld where
errors such as hearsay and incompetent evidence
occurred at indictment stage); see also State v.
Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985)(the fact
defendant was convicted cured any defect in
temporary period of possibly wrongful
detention)(citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
119, 95 S. Ct. 854, 866 (1975).
Quas at 3.
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In contrast to the non-jurisdictional illegal arrest issue, in
disposing of the preliminary hearing issues, despite Mr. Schreuder/s
valid conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, the court did not apply
harmless error analysis or declare that the conviction mooted
defects in Mr. Schreuder's preliminary hearing.

The court addressed

each issue relating to the preliminary hearing fully on the merits,
finding that Mr. Schreuder's preliminary hearing was conducted
properly.

712 P.2d at 267-270.
Particularly because the jury conviction of Mr. Quas is

nullified by the failure of the bindover order to invoke the trial
court's jurisdiction, the jury conviction does not cure the improper
bindover order.

More importantly, because the jury may never have

been selected in the absence of the improper bindover, the jury's
conviction cannot be used to render the bindover error harmless.
See Vasquez v. Hillery. 474 U.S. 254, 263, (1986)(Court could not
rely on defendant's conviction to apply harmless error analysis to
racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury, because
Court could not determine whether the defendant would have been
indicted at all in the absence of the error occurring in the grand
jury proceedings).

II.
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING ISSUE
MUST BE RESOLVED ON THE MERITS.
As the Quas opinion accurately relays, Mr. Quas has never
had the opportunity for a resolution of his claim that this case
should have been dismissed before trial because the prosecution's
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refiling of the information in the successive preliminary hearing
did not meet the Utah Constitution's due process standards set forth
in State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986).

Under Utah law, Mr.

Quas has always had the right to challenge the improper bindover
order, but the district court which had jurisdiction to quash the
bindover order improperly ruled that it had no jurisdiction to
review the bindover order, and the Utah Supreme Court declined Mr.
Quas' petition for interlocutory review of that ruling.

Quas at 2.

The Quas opinion's abstention from the merits, and holding
that any errors in the bindover order are mooted, cured, or rendered
harmless by the conviction entered in the trial court raise
troubling concerns about due process, equal protection and uniform
operation of laws. As is explained below, several constitutional
guarantees require that Mr. Quas' challenge to the preliminary
hearings in his case be heard on the merits.
Due process of law, provided by Article I section 7 of the
Utah Constitution, requires the following essentials before a
person's liberty may be taken by the state:
(a) the existence of a competent person, body, or
agency authorized by law to determine the
questions; (b) an inquiry into the merits of the
question by such person, body or agency; (c)
notice to the person of the inauguration and
purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such
person should appear if he wishes to be heard;
(d) the right to appear in person or by counsel;
(e) fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine
and cross-examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be
rendered upon the record thus made.
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Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945).

The due

process violation stemming from the district court's lack of proper
jurisdiction (resulting from the improper bindover order), is
compounded by the fact that Mr. Quas has never had an opportunity to
be heard on the merits concerning the district court's lack of
jurisdiction.

Id.

Likewise, under federal due process standards, Mr. Quas is
entitled to have the bindover issue resolved on the merits.

The

right to a proper preliminary hearing in Utah has been characterized
by the Utah Supreme Court as "fundamental" and "sacred."
Nelson, 176 P.860, 862 (Utah 1918).

State v.

Depriving Mr. Quas of this

right because the trial court erroneously concluded that it did not
have the jurisdiction to enforce the right would be so fundamentally
unfair as to constitute both a substantive and procedural due
process violation under federal standards.5

As the Court explained

in Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930), "[W]hile it
is for the state courts to determine the adjective as well as the
substantive law of the State, they must, in so doing, accord the
parties due process of law.

Whether acting through its judiciary or

5. Under federal law, "'substantive due process' prevents
the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks the
conscience,7 or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.' When government action depriving a person of
life, liberty or property survives substantive due process scrutiny,
it must still be implemented in a fair manner. This requirement has
traditionally been referred to as 'procedural7 due process." United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)(citations omitted).
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through its legislature, a State may not deprive a person of all
existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the State
has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him
some real opportunity to protect it."

Id. at 681-682 (footnote

omitted).
Principles of uniform operation and equal protection of the
laws also require that Mr. Quas be heard on the merits concerning
the improper bindover order.

Under Quas, through no fault of his

own, Mr. Quas has been denied the right, provided by the law to all
Utah felony defendants,6 to have his preliminary hearings reviewed
on the merits.

But for the erroneous ruling of the district court,

Mr. Quas would have had the remedy provided by the Utah Constitution
under Brickey. dismissal of his case prior to trial.

The trial

court's error is not an acceptable reason to penalize Mr. Quas with
the sacrifice of his right to review of the preliminary hearing
under Article I section 24.

See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661,

670-671 (Utah 1984)(interpreting Article I section 24, the court
explained, "When persons are similarly situated, it is
unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons from
among a larger class on the basis of a tenuous justification that
has little or no merit.").
Federal standards similarly require Utah courts to grant

6. See e.g. State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 270 (Utah
1985)(no equal protection problem arose because defendant did have
the opportunity, given to all felony defendants, for review of the
preliminary hearing).
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Mr. Quas equal protection of the laws granting the right to review
of the bindover order.

See Cooper v. Aaron, 358

U.S. 1 (1958)("The

command of the Fourteenth Amendment is that no 'State' shall deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

'A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its

judicial authorities.

It can act in no other way.

The

constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the
State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted,
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."1).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Quas requests rehearing of his case.

Respectfully submitted this

day o f

'IrljjUl

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Mr. Quas

CANDICE A. JOHNSON

ELIZABETH HOXBROOK
Attorney for ifcri. Quas
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Quas decision

FILED
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(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890601-CA

v.
John Quas,
Defendant and Appellant,

FILED
(February 6, 1992)

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:

Lisa J. Remal, Candice A. Johnson, and Elizabeth
Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S.H. Atherton, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Onne.
GARFF, Judge:
Appellant, John Quas, appeals his conviction of second
degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1991). We affirm.
We recite the Tfacts from the record in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d
1135, 1137 (Utah 1989). On the evening of June 15, 1987,
appellant John Quas and his wife Susan Quas were at home. Both
had been drinking. The two began to argue and to discuss
divorce. Sometime that evening, appellant allegedly shot and
killed Mrs. Quas. At 9:41 p.m. appellant called the Salt Lake
County 911 operator to report that his wife had shot herself. A
police officer and paramedics arrived within four minutes of
appellant's call. Mrs. Quas was found dead, lying on some sheets
in the living room with a gunshot wound in her left eye.
Appellant said he had been in the shower, heard a gunshot, and
came out to find his wife lying on the floor.
On June 16, 1987, appellant was charged with second degree
murder. After a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, the
information was dismissed for lack of probable cause to bind
defendant over for trial. A year later, on July 5, 1988, the
information was refiled. A second Dreliminarv hearina was held

before the same magistrate. On October 24, 1988, the magistrate
found that refiling was appropriate based on new or previously
unavailable evidence. The magistrate determined that the new
evidence, along with the evidence presented at the former
hearing, gave rise to probable cause to bind appellant over to
stand trial.
Appellant moved the district court to quash the bindover
order. The State moved to strike appellant's motion to quash.
The district court granted the State's motion on the ground that
it lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing. Appellant petitioned the
Utah Supreme Court for permission to appeal from the district
court's interlocutory order, and the court denied permission.
The district court then accepted the information, and appellant
was tried and convicted of criminal homicide, murder in the
second degree. He appealed the conviction to the Utah Supreme
Court, which, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1991),
transferred the appeal to this court.
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the district court
had jurisdiction to review the bindover order; (2) whether the
district court correctly accepted the information for purposes of
proceeding to trial; and (3) whether the court properly concluded
that the trial testimony of expert witnesses from the State
Medical Examiner's Office did not violate Rules 403, 404 or 702
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF BINDOVER
The first issue is whether the district court had
jurisdiction to review the bindover order. State v. Humphrey.
176 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 1991) is dispositive of this issue.
The Humphrey court held that "the district court has the inherent
authority and the obligation to determine whether its original
jurisdiction has been properly invoked." Jd. at 9. In other
words, "it is always proper for a trial court, as a threshold
jurisdictional matter, to consider whether it has jurisdiction
over a criminal defendant." Id. at 10. Further, Rule 12(b)(1)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure "explicitly gives
district courts authority to review *defects in the indictment or
information./M Id. at 9.
Applying Humphrey, we hold that the district court erred in
its initial refusal to review the bindover order. However, this
error was harmless. Humphrey suggests that a challenge to a
bindover order is mooted once a defendant has been convicted
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at n.6. The Utah Supreme Court
held: "We believe this right [to a review of bindover orders]
likewise would not be satisfied if the defendant first had to
endure trial in the district court, because any challenges to the
bindover order would be mooted by the trial verdict." Id.

This holding is supported by case law from the United States
Supreme Court and from this state establishing that an error at
the preliminary stage is cured if the defendant is later
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Mechanik.
475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S. Ct. 938, 942 (1986) (presence of two
witnesses in grand jury room, although illegal, is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt in light of subsequent conviction);
Holt v. United States. 218 U.S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 4 (1910)
(conviction upheld where errors such as hearsay and incompetent
evidence occurred at indictment stage); see also State v.
Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) (the fact defendant was
convicted cured any defect in temporary period of possibly
wrongful detention) (citing Gerstein v. Puah, 420 U.S. 103, 119,
95 S. Ct. 854, 866 (1975)).
Therefore, the question as to whether the information should
have been quashed by the district court is moot because any
defect was cured by defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
We now consider issues pertaining to the trial itself.
Appellant argues that the testimony of Dr. Todd Grey, the medical
examiner, and that of Brent Marchant of the State Medical
Examiner's Office, to the effect that the nature of the victim's
wounds was more consistent with homicide than with suicide,
violated Rules 403, 404 and 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Because no contemporaneous objections to this testimony were
made, appellant has waived his right to raise the matter on
appeal, State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert,
denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989), unless the testimony
is plain error, id.; State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341-42 (Utah
App. 1990), or unless there are unusual circumstances. See State
v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991).
Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides
[n]othing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to
the attention of the court." The Utah Supreme Court established
a two-part test to determine plain error. First, the error must
be "plain." That is, "it should have been obvious to a trial
court that it was committing error." Eldredqe, 773 P.2d at 35.
Second, the error must affect the substantial rights of the
accused. That is, the error must be harmful. Id. The policy
behind the plain error test is to allow the court to reach
justice in a given case. Id. at 35 n.8; Braun, 787 P.2d at 1342.
See Utah R. Evid. 102.
M

The transcript reveals that Dr. Grey did not give
psychological profile testimony, condemned in State v. Rimmasch,
775 P.2d 388, 400-03 (Utah 1989), nor did he vouch for the
truthfulness of a witness's testimony based on anecdotal

"statistical" evidence, condemned in State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d
498, 501 (Utah 1986) and also in State v. Iorq. 801 P.2d 938, 941
(Utah App. 1990).
Instead, Dr. Grey addressed the issue of whether the victim
died via suicide or homicide by examining the physical evidence
of the victim's body and by demonstrating the hypothesis of
suicide using a live model whose arm length was identical to that
of the victim. He had the model hold the gun in various
positions to see whether it was possible for Mrs. Quas to shoot
herself with the muzzle sixteen to eighteen inches away from the
entry wound and with the gun oriented so that the bullet path
would correspond to that of the victim. He had the model hold
the gun with either hand, with both hands, and in a position so
she could fire using her thumb. He also had the model hold the
gun in these various positions with her arms extended as far as
possible. He testified that the gun could be held in the right
hand at fourteen or fifteen inches away, in the left hand at
fourteen inches away, or in both hands at twelve and a half or
thirteen inches away. He concluded that, while it may have been
technically possible for Mrs. Quas to shoot herself,
it's a very cumbersome and in my experience
completely atypical way for somebody to
commit suicide. When people shoot
themselves, they usually put the gun where
they want the bullet to go and pull the
trigger. I've never seen a clearly proven
suicide where the person has held the gun as
far as away from their body as they possibly
can before shooting.
Here, the gist of the testimony goes to the fact that, if
the victim had committed suicide, she chose a physically awkward
and hence unlikely method to carry out the deed.
Both Rammel and Iorg condemn the use of evidence "concerning
matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis such as witness
veracity," because such evidence leads to undue prejudice. Iorq.
801 P.2d at 941-42. However, Rammel and Iorq do not apply in
this case. First, Dr. Grey's testimony was not offered as
statistical evidence that Mrs. Quas did not commit suicide.
Rather, the testimony was offered to prove that, while it was
technically possible to achieve suicide given the circumstances,
it would have been "cumbersome" and "atypical." Second, Dr. Grey
was not vouching for another witness's veracity, nor was he
giving statistical probabilities for another's veracity. Third,
even if the remark were prejudicial, it was not sufficiently
obvious to invoke the plain error exception, especially in light

of the corroborating evidence offered by this and other
witnesses.1
Brent Marchant, an investigator with the State Medical
Examiner's Office, did not opine as to whether the death was a
homicide or suicide. Neither did he testify as to the profile of
a hypothetical suicide victim. He testified that Mrs. Quas's
wound was unusual because, from his ten years# experience
investigating many of the one hundred and fifty gunshot suicides
that occur in Utah each year, he had seen only one suicide
gunshot wound inflicted in the eye. That wound was a direct
contact wound, unlike that of the victim. Therefore, even if
Marchant's statement were erroneously admitted, the error is not
sufficiently obvious to invoke the plain error exception.
As to the other issues appellant raises on appeal, we have
reviewed them and find them to be without merit. See State v.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989).
CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt mooted any
defects in the bindover order. The experts' conclusion that the
evidencesupported a homicide rather than a suicide did not
consti*tfte plain errq,r. Wosptierefore affirm.

t? //

'"'; v-

Re^nal W. Garff, Judge / y

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Orme, Judge

1. While the requirement of obviousness may be waived in cases
of H a high degree of harmfulness,11 we do not find such a degree
of harmfulness in this case in light of the corroborating
evidence. Eldredae. 773 P.2d at 35 n.8; Braun, 787 P.2d at 1342.
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Humphrey decision
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ement, a court lacks jurisdiction to decide the
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
motion because there was no existing case in w h ^
to intervene. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1491 n%4
This opinion is subject to revision before
However, some courts, in considering the issue 0 f
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
timeliness of a motion to intervene, have held th^t
parties who have knowledge of contemplated inter. DURHAM, Justice:
vention cannot cut off a right of intervention by a
Vaughn
Vaughn Humphrey,
Harry
settlement. See Annotation, Time Within WM I Petitioners
Right to Intervene May Be Exercised, 37 A.L.R.^j Jamar Gordan, and Bruce Mathews are cri1306, §18[b], at 1362 (1954).
minal defendants in unrelated felony cases
2. Utah Code Ann. §63-46(b)-9(2) states in full:
pending in the district courts of this state. A
The presiding officer shall grant a peticircuit court judge acting as a magistrate
tion for intervention if he determines
bound each defendant over for trial in district
that:
court. Each defendant then moved the district
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may
court to quash the bindover order. In each
be substantially affected by the formal
case, the district court denied the motion,
adjudicative proceeding; and
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to quash
(b) the interests of justice and the
bindover
orders. Each defendant filed an intorderly and prompt conduct of the
erlocutory
appeal with the Utah Court of
adjudicative proceedings will not be
Appeals. That court affirmed the district court
materially impaired by allowing the
intervention.
rulings. State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496
Utah Administrative Rule 86M-5A(J), prom^j. (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (consolidating Humpgated by the Commission, also provides for intery. hrey's and Gordan's appeals); State v.
ention. Rule 861-1-5A(I) provides, with respect iQ Mathews, No. 890666-CA (Utah Ct. App.
motions for consolidation, and by referen^
June 21, 1990). All three cases, now consolimotions for intervention, that the "presiding dated, are before us on a writ of certiorari.
officer" has "wide discretion" in granting or denying We reverse.
motions.
The issue before us is whether, in light of
3. The Tax Commission expresses the concern that }t
recent
statutory and constitutional changes
will have to give all governmental agencies that havc
associated
with the creation of the Utah Court
some legal interest in a given proceeding prior noti^
of their statutory right to intervene. We fail to s^ of Appeals, the district courts no longer have
any reason why such a notice would have to t^ jurisdiction to quash bindover orders. This is
given.
solely a question of law, which we review
under a correctness standard. We thus give no
deference to the decisions below. See City of
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516
Cite as
(Utah), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990).
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Prior to 1986, the jurisdictional provision
governing district courts gave them "appellate
IN THE SUPREME COURT
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribOF THE STATE OF UTAH
unals, and a supervisory control of the same."
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4 (Supp. 1985). A
STATE of Utah,
1986 amendment eliminated this appellate
Plaintiff and Respondent,
jurisdiction. Judicial Article Implementation
•.
Act, ch. 47, §50, 1986 Utah Laws 136-37.1
Vaughn HUMPHREY, Harry Jamar Gordan,
In each of the cases consolidated here, the
and Bruce William Mathews,
trial court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiI>efentente sn3 Petitioners,
ction to quash a bindover order was premised
on this statutory change and a determination
No. 900434
that quashal was an appellate function. The
FILED: December 18,1991
court of appeals similarly concluded that an
attack on a bindover order /falls squarely
Third District, Salt Lake County
within the classic definition of an appeal."
Honorable James S. Sawaya
Humphrey, 794 P.2d at 498. Before this court,
Honorable Frank G. Noel
the State urges the same conclusion, arguing
Honorable Richard H. Moffat
that "what [defendants] sought was review on
the record from the circuit court of the suffiATTORNEYS:
ciency of the evidence presented to that
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogreii, Salt
court....
This type of on-the-record review
Lake City, for plaintiff
of the sufficiency of the evidence ... can be
Elizabeth A. Bowman, James C. Bradshaw,
nothing other than appellate review."
Vernice S. Ah Ching, Elizabeth Holbrook,
This characterization of motions to quash
Salt Lake City, for defendants
bindover orders is twice flawed. First, it mis-

nding that there is probable cause to believe
ie defendant has committed the crime
larged in the information. See Utah R. Crim.
. 7(8)(b). By the bindover order, the magisate requires the defendant "to answer [the
formation] in the district court/ Id. The
formation is then transferred to the district
>urt, permitting that court to take original
risdiction of the matter.2 At that point, the
strict court has the inherent authority and
e obligation to determine whether its original
risdiction has been properly invoked. In
)ing so, the district court need show no
ference to the magistrate's legal conclusion,
tplicit in the bindover order, that the matter
ay proceed to trial in district court, but may
nduct its own review of the order.
Our rules of criminal procedure help clarify
e authority of district courts to control their
iginal jurisdiction. Rule 25(a) permits the
urt to dismiss an information "[i]n its disction, for substantial cause and in furtherance
justice/ Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a). Rule
(b) provides, "Any defense [or] objection ...
lich is capable of determination without the
al of the general issue may be raised prior to
al." Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b). This authority
review pretrial defects must be interpreted
encompass review of the procedure by
tich the matter came before the district
art. Furthermore, rule 12(b)(1) explicitly
r
es district courts authority to review
efects in the indictment or information/
ah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1). When prosecution
:urs by information rather than by indictnt, a preliminary hearing and bindover
ier are integral parts of the prosecution;
:hout the bindover, an information would
t be before the district court. From the
trict court's perspective, therefore, a defect
the bindover order may be treated as a
feet in the information.3
Jurisdiction over a motion to quash a binder order thus fits squarely within Utah
le of Criminal Procedure 12 and follows
ically from rule 25.4 The motion focuses a
trict court's attention on the propriety of
exercise of original jurisdiction, requiring a
ermination of whether it can proceed with
case. Although the examination of prelilary proceedings may involve a "review on
record" of the magistrate's order, consiation of a motion to quash a bindover
ler does not constitute "appellate review" in
formal sense. The conclusion that the
lion is equivalent to an appeal is erroneous.5
rhe second flaw in the State's characterize
m of defendants' motions lies in its claim
t defendants sought "review on the record
m the circuit court." This mischaracteriza1 results in the erroneous conclusion,
ued by the State and adopted by the court

bindover order is through an interlocutory
appeal to the court of appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) and (e).
These statutes do not permit direct interlocutory appeal of magistrates' bindover orders.
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) gives the court of
appeals jurisdiction over "appeals from the
circuit courts," and section 78-2a-3(2)(e)
gives it jurisdiction over "interlocutory appeals
from any court of record in criminal cases."
In the instant cases, however, the records were
not created in a circuit court or any other
court of record; rather, they were created
before a magistrate, as provided by Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 7(7). Although the
magistrate in each case also happened to be a
circuit court judge (as is true in most cases),
our statutory provisions make an unmistakable
distinction between the functions and powers
of a judicial officer acting as magistrate and
one acting as judge of a court. By definition,
"'[magistrate' means a justice of the
Supreme Court, a judge of the district courts,
a judge of the juvenile courts, a judge of the
circuit courts, a judge of the justice courts, or
a judge of any court created by law." Utah
Code Ann. §77-1-3 (Supp. 1990). These
individuals, "when sitting as magistrates hav[e]
the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law
upon magistrates and not those that pertain to
their respective judicial offices." Van Dam v.
Morris, 571 P..2d 1325, 1327 (Utah 1977); cf.
Utah Code Ann. §78-7-16 (powers of
judges contradistinguished from powers of
their courts). Magistrates are not "circuit
courts."6 Furthermore, because the statutory
definition of magistrate includes judges of
courts not of record, as defined in Utah Code
Ann. §78-1-2, the respective functions of
courts of record and magistrates are not coextensive.
Instead, a magistrate's statutory role is to
assist courts of record in various preliminary
matters in felony cases and to be more extensively involved with misdemeanor cases. 7 'A
magistrate's contribution to a felony proceeding is entirely nonadjudicative: "A preliminary hearing is not a trial, and a magistrate ...
does not sit as a judge of a court and exercises
none of the powers of a judge ...." Morris,
571 P.2d at 1327. The fact that a magistrate's
dismissal of a charge does not preclude subsequent prosecution of the same offense, see
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(8)(c), substantiates the
determination that magistrates do not adjudicate.8 We thus conclude, contrary to the court
of appeals' decision below, see 794 P.2d at
500, that a judicial officer functioning as a
magistrate is not functioning as a circuit court
or other court of record. Because magistrates
are not courts of record when they conduct
preliminary hearings and issue bindover

to conclude that magistrates are not courts, a
5U1LUUI1 UIllll Ull l l l l U l l l t a u u i i VTCU tuwu n u n «,, «**v*
conclusion we reached fifteen years ago in Afo r . this could not occur until after the magistrate's
ris, we are aware that other case law a^j preliminary hearing and bindover. See Utah Code
some provisions of our rules of criminal pro- Ann. §77-17-1 (1978); see also State v. Freeman,
cedure and our statutes are inconsistent with 71 P.2d 196, 199 (Utah 1937) (holding that inform^
this holding. In State v. Schreuder, 712 P . j j ation can be filed properly in district court "only
after the accused has been duly bound over and held
264, 270 (Utah 1985), we held that a bindov e r
to answer in the district court by a magistrate").
order entered by a district court judge c o u ^ Although under the current statutory scheme a
be challenged by interlocutory appeal to this felony information (rather than a complaint) is first
court. 10 Dicta in Schreuder suggested th^ t filed before a magistrate, see Utah R. Crim. P. 5(a)
interlocutory appeal also was possible "fro^ & 7(2), it is still true that the district court does not
bindover orders entered in any court." 7 ^ acquire jurisdiction until after a bindover order
P.2d at 270. Our choice of this language w ^ issues and the information and all other records are
probably the result of a common but techi^. transferred to the district court. See Utah R. Crim.
cally incorrect practice of referring to magi$_ P. 10(a) (arraignment to occur only when all records
are*received by district court after bindover); cf.
trates as courts. This imprecision in Schreud^r
Utah Const, art. I, §13 (permitting offenses to be
was immaterial, however, because at the tii^ e "prosecuted by information after examination and
the appellate jurisdiction of this court was not commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination
specifically limited to review of courts of be waived").
record (and the Utah Court of Appeals djj 3. Indeed, as petitioners suggest, there may be no
not yet exist). See Utah Code Ann. §78-^_ meaningful difference between quashal of a bind2 (1977). We must be more careful today, n o ^ over order and dismissal of an information. Histothat, the more precise jurisdictional statutes of rically, an information could not be filed until after
both this court and the court of appeals hav e a preliminary hearing and bindover order, see supra
limited jurisdiction over interlocutory criminal note 2, and thus defects in the hearing or order
would infect the information. We do not decide
orders to review of "appeals from any court of
whether, under our current statutory scheme, there
record." Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(3)(h)
is a difference between guashal of a bindover order
78-2a-3(2)(e)(1991).
and dismissal of an information. We conclude only
# To the extent that language in the .Uta^ that the district court's authority to review defective
Rules, of Criminal Procedure also implies th^ t informations includes the authority to review.defesome functions of magistrates continue to b e ctive bindover orders.
reviewable on interlocutory appeal, the rul^s 4. As petitioners point out, this reading of rules 12
will need revision to conform with the actu^j and 25 is also consistent with rule 10(c). That rule,
however^ is not directly at issue in these cases
status of magistrates and the recent statutory
because these cases do not involve guilty pleas.
modifications in jurisdiction. Legislative rev|.
5. The court of appeals cited State v. Schreuder, 712
sions may also be in order to ensure that a\\ P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that
Statutory provisions recognize the distinction attacks on bindover orders constitute appeals. Humbetween the functions of .magistrates ang phrey, 794 P.2d at 498. Schreuder is inappocourts.
site. It presented an equal protection claim at a time
(before the recent jurisdictional modifications that
Magistrates .are - not courts or tribunal^
They exercise magisterial, not adjudicatory, gave rise to the cases before us today) when district
functions. Review of their orders cannot pro' courts routinely reviewed bindover orders of circuit
court judges. Atypically, in Schreuder the defenperly.be subjected to appellate review und^r
dant's preliminary hearing had been conducted by a
our statutory scheme. More importantly, it } s district court judge. The defendant therefore made
always proper for a trial court, as a threshold an equal protection argument that he did not have
jurisdictional matter, to consider whether } t the opportunity, available to defendants bound over
has jurisdiction over a criminal defendant. W e by circuit court judges, for 'superior court" review.
therefore reverse and remand these cases tc}
We f held that in this circumstance the defendant
the district .courts for consideration of thi could seek superior court review of his preliminary
hearing through interlocutory appfeal to this court.
merits o f the motions to quash.
712
P.2d at 270. But the availability of interlocutory
Reversed and remanded.
appeal is irrelevant t6 whether *ar trial -court also has
the" authority to satisfy itself that* a defendant, is
WE CONCUR:.
properly before it. Schreuder is further inapposite
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
because we conclude below.that under our.current
Richard C. Howe, Associate* Chief Justice
statutory scheme, interlocutory review of a jnagistU Daniel Stewart, Justice
rate's bindover order is no longer ^available,
6. We note that if the orders of magistrates w^re in
Michael D. Zimmerman* Justice
fact'orders of a circuit court, the Utah State Constitution would provide an appeaf ks of right from
J
l . A subsequent amendment once again grantecj these orders. Utah Const.'ah.'I, §12, art. VIII,
district courts-some appellate jurisdiction, but
uui thL
ims §5. Interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals
added jurisdiction is limited to review of informaj would not satisfy this requirement. We believe this
agency adjudicative proceedings. District courts stilj right likewise would not be'satisfied if the defendant
i
_ ^ »«, i w n » i M C r t r < i

this constitutional problem.
7. Currently, the powers and duties of magistrates
are scattered through various provisions of titles 77
and 78 of the Utah Code and through the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, especially rule 7. The
partial codification of the authority of magistrates
in new section 78-7-17.5 of the Utah Code, effective January 1, 1992, further reinforces our conclusion that magistrates do not exercise adjudicatory
authority.
I. We also note that magistrates routinely issue
search warrants to assist in the administration of
ustice and district courts routinely review those
variants without functioning as appellate courts. In
ts brief, the State argues that this review is not the
ame as reviewing bindover orders, because "[a]
listrict court reviews the sufficiency of the search
warrant only to determine whether evidence will be
idmissible in the trial pending in that court. It does
tot issue an order overturning the order of another
ourt ...." But a district court's review of the suffaency of the preliminary hearing and bindover
•rder similarly serves only to determine whether the
lformation will be accepted in that court for the
urposes of proceeding to trial. When quashal is
ppropriate, the district court does not overturn the
rder of another court; it vacates the order of the
lagistrate.
Of course, once a district court has refused to
uash a bindover order, the district court's ruling
>uld then become the subject of an interlocutory
>peal.
I. See supra n.5.
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
We granted certiorari to review a memorandum decision of the court of appeals which
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff
Percy Mounteer's complaint against defendant
Utah Power & Light Company (UP&L).
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 773
P.2d 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The dismissal
was for plaintiffs failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff was employed by UP&L in its
mining activities in Emery County. In December 1984, a fire at the Wilberg Mine caused
the death of twenty-one miners. Plaintiff was
on duty when the fire broke out, and as a
result of his involvement in endeavoring to
control the fire, he developed symptoms of
post-traumatic stress syndrome. However, he
continued in his employment. Some time later,
Niki Larsen, an in-house security guard
employed by UP&L, was assigned to investigate plaintiff for suspected drug use. During
an interview of plaintiff at his work, she allegedly called the mine superintendent over a
loudspeaker and accused plaintiff of being on
drugs. Other employees heard the accusations.
Plaintiff asserts that this accusation aggravated his post-traumatic stress syndrome,
requiring him to be treated at a psychiatric
hospital and rendering him permanently disabled from employment.
Plaintiff brought this action for slander,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
UP&L moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The motion was premised on our decision in Bryan v. Utah International, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975), which held
that an employee acting in the course and
scope of his or her employment who intentionally injures a co-worker is not protected
by the exclusivity provision of our Workers*
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §35-160. However, the employer is liable only to the
extent of workers' compensation benefits
unless the employer directed or intended the
injurious act. In the instant action, the trial
court granted the motion to dismiss after
reviewing the complaint and finding that plaintiff had failed to allege facts supporting an
inference that UP&L had intended or directed
Larsen's injurious act. The court of appeals
agreed that Bryan was controlling and affirmed the dismissal.
Plaintiff first contends that the court of
appeals erred in holding that his claim for
slander against UP&L was barred by Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-60, which provides:

